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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Stephanie Sue Henning appeals from the district court’s order revoking her probation.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
After becoming suspicious of Henning’s behavior and general lifestyle enhancements
made seemingly beyond her means, Jayo Development Inc. hired an outside accounting firm to
conduct a financial audit. (R., p.64; PSI, pp.22, 427-435.) The audit concluded that Henning, an
office manager who had been employed at the company since 2007, embezzled at least $155,925
between 2013 and 2015. 1 (R., p.64; PSI, pp.427-428.) Henning admitted to stealing from the
company and was terminated from her employment. (R., p.64; PSI, p.427.)
The audit revealed that Henning engaged in three forms of theft over the multi-year period
of time: (1) check tampering, which involved Henning generating false documents showing
company payments being made to different vendors, but paying herself with the money instead;
(2) utilizing Jayo checking accounts to pay her personal credit card bills; and (3) payroll tampering,
which involved generating false employee reimbursements that Henning would receive the
proceeds of, and directing company money to pay her dental and medical insurance premiums
despite this not being a benefit of her employment. (PSI, pp.423-424, 428-434.)

1

The audit was unable to ascertain the loss from any theft that may have been committed prior to
2013, when Jayo Development Inc. changed certain accounting systems. (PSI, p.423.) The audit
also identified other scope limitations in its investigation. (PSI, p.434.)

1

Henning would later explain to the PSI investigator that she started stealing money after
she began having a difficult time paying medical bills for treatment provided to her children. (PSI,
pp.23-24.) However, she also purchased a new home, a new car, made many other large purchases,
enjoyed traveling frequently, and engaged in a lifestyle unsubstantiated by her work salary. (R.,
p.64; PSI, pp.22, 428.) She also took an extended trip to Mexico following her termination from
employment. (R., p.64; PSI, pp.22, 428.) She stated that she had considered leaving her job with
Jayo Development Inc. to make more money elsewhere, but ultimately did not because of loyalty
and because Jayo Development “depended on her.” (PSI, p.33.) She also stated that her
incarceration would not benefit anyone, and that she wished to be placed on probation so that she
could repay her victims. (Id.)
The state charged Henning with three counts of grand theft, with each count reflecting
approximately one year of the embezzlement schemes. (R., pp.51-52.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Henning pled guilty to two of the counts and the state dismissed the third. (R., pp.5666, 68-69.) At the sentencing hearing, the district court expressed concern about Henning’s
restitution repayment plans. (See R., p.68.) Henning’s counsel represented that Henning was
hoping to obtain better employment to pay restitution, and that she owned a home with a value of
$235,000 and a mortgage of $188,000. (See id.)
The district court imposed a unified 14-year sentence with two years fixed on Count I, and
a consecutive unified 10-year sentence with one year fixed on Count 2, but retained jurisdiction.
(R., pp.70-73.) The court also ordered Henning to pay $191,526.14 in restitution, an amount which
included the costs of the investigation to uncover her theft and other collateral financial
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consequences suffered by the company. (R., pp.68-69, 76-77; PSI, pp.22-23.) At the conclusion
of the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended Henning’s sentences and placed
her on probation. (R., pp.80-84.) The ordered restitution was made a term of Henning’s probation.
(Id.) Specifically, Henning was required to pay $8,000 per year ($665 per month), beginning
within 30 days after she found employment. 2 (R., pp.80, 85-86.) The court also required Henning
to submit monthly budget reports to her probation officer. (See R., p.80.)
During Henning’s probation, the victim began to contact the state about not receiving full
restitution payments. (PSI, pp.552-553.) In December 2017, the state filed a motion for probation
violation asserting that Henning failed to make full restitution payments as required between
March 2017 and December 2017. (R., pp.88-90.) The state further asserted that as of December
2017, Henning was past due on her restitution obligations in the amount of $5,259.00. (Id.)
Henning admitted to violating her probation as alleged by the state. (See R., p.118.) The district
court reinstated Henning on probation. (R., p.119, 121-126.)
After Henning failed to make additional full restitution payments, her probation officer
directed her to submit a “payment ability evaluation” form. (R., pp.144-173; 10/17/19 Tr., p.10,
L.22 – p.11, L.8.) Then, approximately nine months after her probation was reinstated, the state
filed a second motion for probation violation, again asserting that Henning had failed to make full
2

At some point, the district court stated during a hearing that Henning was required to make
payments of only $650/month. (See 10/17/19 Tr., p.41, L.5 – p.42, L.5.) The court recognized
this misstatement, clarified that it would not hold Henning responsible for the $15/month
discrepancy, and concluded that Henning willfully violated her probation regardless of what
amount between $650/month and $665/month she was required to pay. (10/17/19 Tr., p.41, L.5 –
p.42, L.5; p.46, L.4 – p.47, L.4.)
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restitution payments as required between May 2018 and January 2019. (R., pp.127-129.) The
state further asserted that as of February 2019, Henning was past due on her restitution obligations
in the amount of $4,370. (Id.) At an evidentiary hearing, Henning submitted a budget detailing
her income and expenses; and the state submitted a log of Henning’s restitution payments and the
completed payment ability evaluation form. (10/17/19 Tr., p.6, L.4 – p.9, L.5; State’s Exhibits 1,
2; Defendant’s Exhibit A.) Henning asserted that while she had not kept up with the required
restitution payments, this violation was not willful because she could not afford to pay more than
she did. (10/17/19 Tr., p.42, L.7 – p.45, L.15.) The state argued that Henning was not reasonably
paying as much as she could, primarily as evidenced by the fact that Henning’s own budget
reflected unaccounted for monthly “surplus” income that was not paid as restitution. (10/17/19
Tr., p.37, L.3 – p.40, L.3.)
The district court concluded that Henning willfully violated her probation by failing to
make required restitution payments to the best of her reasonable ability. (10/17/19 Tr., p.45, L.20
– p.48, L.4.) The district court revoked Henning’s probation and ordered the originally-imposed
sentences to be executed. (R., pp.194-197; 11/26/19 Tr., p.63, L.16 – p.65, L.9.) The court also
denied Henning’s subsequent I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (R., pp.202-203, 211214.) Henning timely appealed. (R., pp.198-200.)
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ISSUES
Henning states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err in finding that Ms. Henning willfully violated her
probation where she was unable to pay the monthly restitution amount in
full due to her [indigency]?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Henning’s
probation?

(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Does substantial evidence support the district court’s conclusion that Henning’s probation
violation was willful?

2.

Has Henning failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her
probation?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court’s Conclusion That Henning’s Probation
Violation Was Willful
A.

Introduction
Henning contends that the district court erred in concluding that she willfully violated her

probation by failing to make full required restitution payments. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-11.)
However, a review of the record reveals that substantial evidence supports the court’s
determination.

B.

Standard Of Review
A “trial court’s factual findings in a probation revocation proceeding, including a finding

that a violation has been proven, will be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence.”
State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 766, 171 P.3d 253, 257 (2007) (citing State v. Russell, 122 Idaho
488, 490, 835 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1992); State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070
(Ct. App. 2003)). A trial court’s determination that a probation violation is willful will also be
upheld if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710-712, 390 P.3d
434, 436-438 (2017).

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Henning Willfully Violated Her Probation By
Failing To Pay Required Restitution
A probationer has a protected liberty interest in continuing her probation. State v. Blake,

133 Idaho 237, 243, 985 P.2d 117, 123 (1999). Consequently, a court may not revoke probation
without a finding that the probationer violated the terms of probation. Rose, 144 Idaho at 765, 171

6

P.3d at 256 (citing Blake, 133 Idaho at 243, 985 P.2d at 123); see also I.C. §§ 19-2603; 20-222. At
an evidentiary hearing, the state bears the burden of providing satisfactory proof of a violation,
though proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required. Id. (citing State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311,
314, 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988)); see also I.C. § 19-2602. The finding of a probation violation must
be based on verified facts, and the trial court’s exercise of discretion must be informed by an
accurate knowledge of the probationer’s behavior. Id. (citing State v. Tracy, 119 Idaho 1027, 1028,
812 P.2d 741, 742 (1991)).
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f) provides, in relevant part:
The court must not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the defendant
or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully violated
a condition of probation.
In the context of fines and restitution, in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-669 (1983),
the United States Supreme Court explained the constitutional requirement that a probation
violation be willful before the probation may be revoked:
If the probationer has willfully refused to pay the fine or restitution when he has
the means to pay, the State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction
to enforce collection. Similarly, a probationer’s failure to make sufficient bona
fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order to pay the fine or
restitution may reflect an insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes to
society for his crime. In such a situation, the State is likewise justified in revoking
probation and using imprisonment as an appropriate penalty for the offense. But
if the probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and
yet cannot do so through no fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to
revoke probation automatically without considering whether adequate alternative
methods of punishing the defendant are available.
(footnote and internal citation omitted).
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In Bearden, the United States Supreme Court also held “that in revocation proceedings for
failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure
to pay.” Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672. Without such an inquiry, the Court found, probation could be
revoked for unwilling failures to pay fines, which would be “contrary to the fundamental fairness
required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 672-673. If such a failure to pay was willful, a
court may “revoke probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment within the authorized
range of its sentencing authority.” Id. at 672. On the other hand, if “the probationer could not
pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must consider
alternate measures of punishment other than imprisonment.” Id.
The state initially notes that a probationer’s failure to pay required restitution is a unique
type of probation violation where there is no affirmative conduct or omission that can be easily
proven through a reporting of actions taken or omissions made by the probationer. Instead, in
determining whether a probationer’s failure to pay ordered restitution is “willful,” the court must
often make a judgment call utilizing material evidence that will generally be in the control and the
possession of the probationer. 3
Despite these evidentiary hurdles, in this case, the district court thoroughly inquired into
Henning’s ability to pay, and reasonably concluded, from the evidence presented to it at the

3

Recognizing this issue, numerous jurisdictions have found that the defendant bears the burden of
proving inability to pay in probation revocation proceedings based upon failure to pay the ordered
restitution. See e.g., People v. McPherson, 897 P.2d 923, 927 (Colo. App. 1995); State v. Jones,
337 S.E.2d 195, 197 (N.C. App. 1985); Stanfield v. State, 718 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986); Keselica v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 611, 612-613 (Va. 2000).
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evidentiary hearing, that while Henning was reasonably unable to pay the full required restitution
to that point, Henning’s probation violation was still willful because she failed to make sufficient
bona fide efforts to satisfy her restitution obligations to the best of her ability. (10/17/19 Tr., p.46,
L.8 – p.48, L.4.)
As the prosecutor explained, the exhibits demonstrated surplus monthly income amounts
earned by Henning that were not paid to restitution. (10/17/19 Tr., p.37, L.3 – p.38, L.16.) In
September 2018, Henning reported a $493 income surplus, but paid only $148 in restitution. In
October 2018, Henning reported a $378 income surplus, but paid only $298 in restitution. In
November 2018 there was an income surplus of $340 against a $198 restitution payment; in
December 2018, a $504 surplus against a $498 restitution payment; and in January 2019, a $698
surplus against a $248 restitution payment. (Id.; State’s Exhibit A; Defendant’s Exhibit 1.) This
evidence reflected earned income that was not utilized for any reasonably necessary purpose, but
was also not paid to restitution, all occurring in months corresponding with the state’s probation
violation allegation. (See
- - R., pp.127-129.)
Henning attempted to explain away this surplus by admitting that her budgeting and
reporting of expenses was not precise. Henning acknowledged that she “ball-parked” several of
her expenses in her prepared budget (10/17/19 Tr., p.19, Ls.5-21), forgot to include other expenses
(10/17/19 Tr., p.21, Ls.1-16), and did not know how much she owed on her medical bills (10/17/19
Tr., p.26, Ls.4-8). As her counsel summarized at the evidentiary hearing, “[Henning’s] budget is
not, I guess, to the degree accurate enough to pinpoint.” (10/17/19 Tr., p.44, Ls.10-16.) As the
state further pointed out, Henning’s reported $400 per month expense for groceries, every month,
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was also not likely to be precise, and was also probably more than she reasonably needed to spend.
(10/17/19 Tr., p.32, Ls.1-5; p.38, Ls.17-19; p.40, Ls.11-14.)
Henning’s response at the evidentiary hearing further illustrates the challenges in proving
a willful violation in these types of circumstances, where the probationer’s own failure to properly
account for money that she lawfully owed to individuals that she victimized with her criminal
activity is a defense to the state’s assertion of a willful probation violation. By submitting an
imprecise and inaccurate accounting of her financial situation, Henning willfully deprived the state
of a full opportunity to respond, and hindered the district court’s ability to make a determination
based upon this information alone. However, in this case, in light of the other evidence in the
record supporting the district court’s determination of willfulness, Henning cannot show error.
Indeed, the state highlighted other issues related to Henning’s spending and income.
Henning possessed two cell phones for a period of approximately seven months. (10/17/19 Tr.,
p.26, L.20 – p.27, L.10.) After she finally cancelled service on one of the phones, her monthly cell
phone expense decreased from $70 to $35 – a difference in amount that Henning acknowledged
she could have saved the entire previous seven months. (Id.) Further, the cell phones were Android
smart phones with internet data plans. (10/17/19 Tr., p.27, Ls.11-21.) Henning also admitted that
she did not actively look for better-paying employment. (10/17/19 Tr., p.17, Ls.7-16.) She was
also making a $210 monthly car payment and a $75 monthly car insurance payment, and admitted
she was not looking for less expensive options for personal transportation. (10/17/19 Tr., p.32,
Ls.6-20.) Henning also apparently never attempted to petition the court to modify her repayment
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schedule in light of her financial struggles, despite the probation officer advising her to do so.
(10/17/19 Tr., p.11, Ls.9-12.)
Additionally, while not an issue developed at the evidentiary hearing, perhaps because it
consisted of other material evidence within her own control, 4 there was no full accounting for the
$155,000 Henning stole from her employer, and how much, if any, of that amount could be utilized
to help fulfill her restitution obligations. A court may presume that a defendant possesses the fruits
of her theft when analyzing her ability to pay restitution. See e.g., United States v. Olson, 104 F.3d
1234, 1237-1238 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Vogt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1092 (3rd Cir. 1996); United
States v. Lampien, 89 F.3d 1316, 1324-1325 (7th Cir. 1996) (overruled on other grounds); United
States v. Salas-Fernandez, 620 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2020).

Finally, Henning’s counsel

acknowledged, at the evidentiary hearing, that “when push comes to shove,” Henning “may have
been able to pay a slight amount more.” (10/17/19 Tr., p.43, Ls. 22-24.)
While the district court was tasked with making a judgment call utilizing some imprecise
and inaccurate information provided by Henning, substantial evidence supports the court’s
determination that because Henning did not make bona fide efforts to pay as much as she

4

Other evidence exclusively within Henning’s control referenced by the state was the financial
ramifications of her cohabitation with an individual she was having a romantic relationship with.
Henning asserted that she paid rent and utilities in this living arrangement, but acknowledged that
her boyfriend sometimes made unspecified purchases for her. (10/17/19 Tr., p.18, Ls.8 – p.19,
L.11; p.29, L.7 – p.30, L.4.) While the extent of any such financial support is unclear, Henning’s
boyfriend did purchase cosmetic surgery for her prior to the dates of the probation violations in
this case. (10/17/19 Tr., p.28, L.19 – p.29, L.8; p.35, Ls.13-15; see also R., p.156.)
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reasonably could, the probation violation was willful. This Court should therefore affirm the
district court’s determination.

II.
Henning Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Her
Probation
A.

Introduction
Henning contends that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her probation.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.11-20.) However, a review of the record reveals that the district court acted
well within its discretion in choosing to revoke Henning’s probation after Henning’s second
probation violation for failing to meet her restitution obligations.

B.

Standard Of Review
It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions

of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324,
325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261
(Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988).
C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Revoke Henning’s Probation
In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is

achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton,
127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at
327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been
established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is
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authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at
327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989).
A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the
trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the
propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial
court's decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct.
App. 2012). Thus, an appellate court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court
relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on
appeal. Id.
In this case, a review of the record reveals that the district court acted well within its
discretion to revoke Henning’s probation after her second probation violation, and after three years
of failing to make ordered restitution payments. 5
On appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-14), Henning takes particular issue with:

(1)

comments made by the prosecutor during the disposition hearing that he was recommending
probation revocation due to the size and scope of Henning’s underlying theft, rather than because
of her probation violations (11/26/19 Tr., p.55, Ls.19-24); (2) the district court’s stated agreement
with the prosecutor that its determination was not about the probation violation and was a
“sentence for the original offense” (11/26/19 Tr., p.65, Ls.2-4); and (3) the court’s comment that
5

Henning also asserts constitutional violations associated with the revocation of her probation.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.14-16.) However, because, as discussed above, substantial evidence
supports the district court’s determination that Henning’s probation violation was willful,
Henning’s constitutional arguments fail. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668-669.
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Henning was fortunate that a different judge initially sentenced her, because it would have
sentenced Henning “to prison the first time.” (11/26/19 Tr., p.63, Ls.23-25.) However, a review
of the context of these statements reveal that the prosecutor and court were fairly discussing
Henning’s underlying crimes in the context of her probation violation, which was inseparably
related to Henning’s theft.
The prosecutor, likely concerned about any implication that he sought to punish Henning
for mere inability to pay, explained instead that its recommendation was not about the failure to
pay restitution, per se, but was ultimately about Henning’s massive underlying theft. This was
true. It was Henning’s theft that led directly to the ordered restitution, an obligation which, in at
least substantial part, led to the district court’s willingness to place and reinstate Henning onto
probation so that she could continue to work to satisfy her obligations. (11/26/19 Tr., p.63, L.23 –
p.65, L.1) (the district court explaining the relationship between Henning’s probation restitution
obligations and her underlying crimes.)
Further, it is clear from the record that the district court considered the nature of Henning’s
probation violation rather than simply engage in a “re-sentencing” based upon the underlying
crimes alone. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, after finding that Henning willfully
violated her probation, the court set out the disposition hearing four weeks – longer than the state
wanted the hearing to be set out – so that it could evaluate Henning’s actions in the meantime to
better inform its disposition determination. (10/17/19 Tr., p.49, L.15 – p.50, L.23.) Then, at the
disposition hearing itself, the district court specifically inquired as to what additional restitution
payments Henning had made since the evidentiary hearing. (11/26/19 Tr., p.53, L.10 – p.54, L.14.)
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Further, in revoking probation, the court discussed the impact of Henning’s probation violation,
which included noting how Henning was placed on probation based upon her promise to pay
restitution, that this promise should have been her first obligation, and that Henning willfully failed
to keep this promise because she chose to prioritize her own comfort and convenience over making
her victims whole (11/26/19 Tr., p.64, L.6 – p.65, L.1).
Further, the extended scope and repetitive nature of Henning’s massive theft, which lasted
several years and amounted to a total of at least $155,925 stolen and tens of thousands of dollars
in other financial consequences suffered by the company (PSI, pp.423-424, 428-434), is not
irrelevant to any determination of whether Henning’s probation should have been revoked, and the
district court thus did not err by referencing it. As noted above, unlike other types of probation
violations, Henning’s crime and the failure to pay ordered restitution were inescapably related.
She was ordered to pay a large amount of restitution directly because of her massive theft. She
likely obtained the opportunity of probation, at least in significant part, so that she could work and
make her victims whole. Having willfully failed to do that, the purpose of Henning’s probation
was negative impacted, and the district court reasonably determined that probation was no longer
adequately serving this purpose.
Finally, at the disposition hearing, defense counsel acknowledged Henning’s shortcomings
in budgeting, and her failures to properly account for her income, expenses, and ability to make
the required payments each month. (11/26/19 Tr., p.59, L.18 – p.60, L.13.) Counsel suggested
that Henning take budgeting classes and more properly account for her income and expenses.
(11/26/19 Tr., p.60, Ls.7-13.) However, by this point, Henning had already been on probation for

15

three full years. (See R., pp.81-84.) If budgeting and accurate personal finance accounting was
not a priority by this point, it was not unreasonable for the district court to presume that it would
continue not to be a priority going forward. The court thus did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that, after three years of willfully failing to reasonably meet her restitution obligations,
probation revocation was appropriate.
The district court acted well within its discretion in deciding to revoke Henning’s
probation. This Court should therefore affirm this determination.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order revoking
Henning’s probation.
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2020.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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